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 The ‘Is’ in Animal‐is‐m 
Tristan Tondino* 
Abstract 
Eric T. Olson argues for a position in personal identity called Animalism. 
Olson's definition of ‘what we are’ is what the biological community currently 
defines as the ‘human animal’. While Olson argues his definition is determinate 
and anti-relativist, I object by maintaining that his definition is fundamentally soft 
relativist. This is accomplished by asking : 1) why favour the biological definition 
over other cultural definitions ? – and by arguing : 2) that nothing stops the 
biological definition from changing ; 3) that the biological definition is 
classificatory and not ontologically explanatory ; 4) that biology may drop the 
concept ‘human animal’ leaving no definition of ‘what we are’. Finally, I look at 
which ontological decisions Olson makes and ask if there is any hope for 
Animalism and for the human philosopher with no proven ontology. In my 
conclusion, I follow Olson’s surprising admission by suggesting that I have no idea 
what we are.  
Introducing Personhood 
Eric T. Olson rarely mentions the word ‘person’. One might be 
tempted to suggest he seems uncomfortable with it. As soon as he 
begins to use ‘person’, he shifts to the words ‘human animal’ and the 
personal pronoun ‘I’. He writes : “I don’t want to argue about what it 
is to be a person. I don’t find it an interesting question1”. This is not 
______________ 
* The author is a Master’s student in philosophy (Université de Montréal). 
The author wishes to thank Michel Seymour and Jean-Pierre Marquis for 
offering such fascinating courses and for their support ; Anthony Philbin for 
providing editorial assistance ; Charles Côté-Bouchard and the writing 
committee of Ithaque. 
1 Olson, E. T. (2007a), What Are We ? A Study in Personal Ontology, p. 44. 
Tristan Tondino 
 108 
to say that he avoids ‘personhood’ entirely : “I say that you and I and 
the other people who walk the earth are animals [...] A human person 
is roughly someone who relates to a human animal in the way that 
you and I do, whatever that is2”.  
In “An Argument for Animalism” Olson remarks : “In every 
actual case, the number of people we think there are, is just the 
number of human animals. Every actual case in which we take 
someone to survive or perish is a case where a human animal survives 
or perishes3”. And elsewhere : 
I am not convinced there is any one metaphysical sort of thing 
that people in general are or must be. Or if there is we cannot know 
it until we have [...] ruled out some of the items on [the following] list 
– gods, thinking machines, [angels, robots] and [corporations like 
Apple Computer Inc.]4.   
In other writings, Olson seems to struggle with the idea that 
persons have certain mental capacities, that they may be what Locke 
would call them : “thinking intelligent beings”5. ‘Person’ for Olson, is 
a matter of linguistic convention and he frequently conveys the extent 
to which there seems to be little agreement on what the word 
‘person’ entails. 
Sometimes, he is more direct : “There are six billion people 
because there are six billion human beings – human animals, 
members of the species Homo sapiens6”. If it were up to Olson 
alone, my hunch is that he would simply re-define ‘person’ as exactly 
what biology calls Homo sapiens. To Olson, a human animal is defined 
by the biological community as a being which begins somewhere 
around 16 days after conception (organogenesis) and ends at death. 
For the time being, I will ask that we set aside the question : What is a 
person to Olson ? – with a promise to return to it occasionally and work 
in a new direction following his lead to “limit the inquiry to 
ourselves7” – the human animals.   
______________ 
2 Olson, E.T. (2003a), “An Argument for Animalism”, p. 320. 
3 Ibid., p. 333. 
4 Olson, E. T. (2007a), What Are We ? A Study in Personal Ontology, p. 9. 
5 Locke, J. (1975), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, first published in 
1694, p. 335. 
6 Olson, E.T. (2003a), “An Argument for Animalism”, p. 346. 
7 Olson, E. T. (2007a), What Are We ? A Study in Personal Ontology, p. 9. 
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Category Mistakes and Verbal Disputes  
Olson is slightly revisionist regarding philosophical terminology, 
and it is easy to understand why. Many of us have found ourselves in 
a disagreement only to recognize that the definitions of our terms 
determine the nature of that disagreement. In recent years, the 
expression ‘verbal dispute’ has been coined to denote this linguistic 
frustration. One suggested resolution is to supply a new “neutral 
vocabulary”.   
Similarly, Frege’s craving for an ideal philosophical, scientific and 
mathematical language exemplifies this way of thinking8. Frege, 
however, may not have been involved in a normative project 
regarding language – he was intent on distinguishing science from 
psychologism9. Nonetheless, the craving to limit our meanings is at 
least as old as philosophy itself. Even the Pre-Socratics and Plato 
were obsessed with the meaning of various words commonly taken 
for granted. At any rate there are arguably several good reasons, say, 
for naming only one tooth number 1710.  
Olson’s closing remarks in “Is There a Bodily Criterion” echo this 
craving transposed into his philosophical worldview regarding words 
like ‘mind’, ‘body’ and in other writings regarding the word ‘self’ : “I 
suggest talk of people’s bodies, is like talk of people’s minds11”. He 
adds : “[I]f the word ‘self’ has no agreed meaning, and leads us into 
troubles we otherwise could avoid, and if we could easily get on 
without it, there can be no reason, other than tradition, to continue to 
speak of the self12”. He suggests philosophers would do well to move 
certain words out of the philosophical vocabulary and into, say, a 
poetic one. There might, nonetheless, be certain pre-scientific 
______________ 
8 Seymour, M. (2005), L’Institution  du langage, p. 228-43. See 13 characteristics 
of Frege’s Ideal Language. 
9 Ibid., p. 240. 
10 One of the many characteristics of science is linguistic and/or symbolic 
regimentation. Regimentation alone is insufficient. How and whether this 
applies to philosophy is another matter. 
11 Olson, E. T. (2006), “Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity ?”, 
p. 258. 
12 Olson, E. T. (1998), “There is no Problem of the Self”, p. 657. 
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advantages to this – science, after all, must have grown out of natural 
language. 
Debates naturally rage on about the possibility of idealizing 
language with the ramifications of attempting to clean our 
philosophical language thankfully spilling over into the political and 
ethical.  
Verbal disputes are probably not always the result of category 
mistakes but I believe many are. This essay will include the suggestion 
that a good number of the problems of personal identity are indeed 
the result of category mistakes. 
It’s All Locke’s Fault 
Well, not exactly. Olson points out that “9 out of 10 philosophers 
[...] do not think we are animals13”. He also lists many others from 
Plato onward who believed we are something other than animals. 
Paul Snowdon, another animalist, blames Locke for entrenching this 
idea in modern philosophy. To Locke, what we are is our memories14. 
This implies that if we lost our memories due, for example, to a brain 
injury, we would cease to exist. Snowdon argues that Locke’s error 
was generated from his deep need to distinguish us from animals, 
which resulted in his “collaps[ing] the category human animal15”. But, 
perhaps we only need to amend this formulation, as Olson suggests, 
by saying humans are “very special animals16”. It is probably worth 
arguing that religious beliefs have had a lot to do with why we are not 
generally considered animals. To some people, what we are is our 
souls. 
Third Person/First Person 
I would like to suggest that we can study aspects of Olson’s work 
by working with the third person. He frequently uses ‘I’ or ‘you’ in 
his various arguments – e.g. the thinking-animal argument17 – so it 
______________ 
13 Olson, E.T. (2003a), “An Argument for Animalism”, p. 318. 
14 Locke, J. (1975), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 335. 
15 Snowdon, P. (2009), “Paul Snowdon on Persons and Animals”. 
16 Olson, E.T. (2003a), “An Argument for Animalism”, p. 321. 
17 Olson, E.T. (2004), “Animalism and the Corpse Problem”, p. 266. 
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would seem possible to shift to a proper name, say, ‘Jones’. I would 
like to suggest it is fair to proceed in the third person, albeit 
cautiously, since Olson’s use of ‘I’, ‘we’ and ‘you’ is rather difficult to 
clarify anyway. First, second or third person is irrelevant to the 
problem at hand, i.e. are we animals ? A note on typography : I will 
use Jones to refer to the person or animal ; ‘Jones’ to the word itself ; 
Jones’ as the possessive case ; and Joneses for the plural, e.g. many 
families named by ‘Jones’. 
‘Is’ is one slippery little word 
I begin my argument relating to ‘is’ here. Consider the 
proposition : Jones is such an animal. We can immediately distinguish 
what we might call the is of metaphor. Olson alludes to this19 although 
he does not at any point posit that he has used the is of metaphor. 
Olson states that he is sometimes misunderstood as though he were 
saying we are animalistic in moral terms or that we are “merely 
animals20” as in : Jones is merely an animal.  
Lynne Rudder Baker, for example believes this is an implication 
of Olson’s Animalism. Animals, she suggests, are “brutish and we are 
not”. She further stresses that “human animals constitute us but are 
not us21”. For Baker : Jones is constituted by a human animal. Jones is 
essentially a person.   
Olson counters that we are only contingently persons, in a similar 
way to being contingently philosophers or singers. For Olson : Jones is 
contingently a person to the extent that we define ‘person’ in whatever 
way we do contingently.  
We may wish to employ the distinction which Olson attributes to 
David Wiggins between “substance-concept” and “phase-sortal” to 
help us clarify this matter work through the details of our puzzle over 
‘person’22. To Olson, the substance-concept is ‘human animal’ 
whereas ‘person’ is a phase-sortal23. To Baker the opposite is true. 
______________ 
19 Olson, E.T. (2003a), “An Argument for Animalism”, p. 321. 
20 Ibid., p. 321. 
21 Baker, L. R. (2001), Persons and Bodies, p. 12-18. 
22 Wiggins, D. (1967), Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity, p. 7. 
23 Olson, E.T. (1997), The Human Animal, Personal Identity Without Psychology, 
p. 29-31. 
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This distinction between substance-concept and phase-sortal can also 
be found in Derek Parfit’s work. He states : “Shoemaker assumes 
that what we are essentially is persons, while I regard it as acceptable 
to claim what we are essentially is human beings treating the concept 
person as a phased-sortal24”. Here, Parfit is looking like he’s become an 
animalist.  
If there is a resolution to this dispute it seems to revolve around a 
combination of the word ‘is’ and the meanings of words that refer to 
us. The two elements cannot be easily detached. But, why is ‘is’ such 
a slippery word ? At times it infers existence and at other times 
identity or sameness. Even the title of Olson’s fascinating article “Is 
There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity ?” is itself a riddle 
beginning with the word ‘is’. Criterions are not the type of thing we 
ordinarily would think of as existing, but they must exist in some 
form of ‘is’. Olson remarks : “It is inconvenient that the words 
‘identity’ and ‘same’ mean so many different things : numerical 
identity, qualitative identity, individual psychological identity, and 
more25”. I would suggest it’s more than “inconvenient” ; it’s 
confusing.  
In the above-mentioned article, Olson presents many attempts to 
formulate a “bodily criterion”. A bodily criterion would be a 
formulation properly expressing that “we are our bodies”. We can 
call the view that we are our bodies bodyism26. Judith Jarvis Thompson 
is a bodyist although at times it would appear she is more correctly 
described as an animalist. Occasionally she writes in reference to 
what seems to be the notion of immortality, thus showing her 
animalist tendencies : “What I want in wanting to survive is that this 
body [my emphasis] should continue to function in the ways in which 
living human bodies function when they support consciousness27”. 
So she seems to be suggesting what she is, is her living body, which is 
fairly close to Olson’s animalism and neither view seems 
incompatible with cherishing one’s consciousness. For Olson, 
however, we are our living bodies whether we are conscious or not. 
______________ 
24 Parfit, D. (1999), “Experiences, Subjects and Conceptual Schemes”, 
p. 218. 
25 Olson, E. T. (2010), “Personal Identity”. 
26 Shoemaker, S. (1999), “Self and Body”. 
27 Thomson, J. J. (1997), “People and their Bodies”, p. 222. 
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There are three elements I would like to point out about Olson’s 
powerful arguments against strict bodyism, i.e. that we are our bodies.  
The first element is that to the extent that bodyism does not 
include the fact that we are alive, it cannot properly explain what we 
are. None of the bodily criteria Olson provides succeeds in satisfying 
him for this reason. They are insufficiently subtle to provide an 
ontology which can cover our bodies while we are alive and our 
bodies when they have become corpses.   
The second, and most interesting element in my view is that in 
each bodily criterion there is the presence of that troubling word ‘is’. 
This second element is inextricably linked to the first. A bodyist 
would claim : Jones is his body. To Olson, whatever Jones is, he cannot 
be his body because his body sometimes lives and sometimes does 
not. Furthermore, the idea that Jones is alive is fairly determinate but 
the idea that his body exists is sometimes indeterminate.  
The third intriguing element is that if there were a bodily criterion, 
it would have a feature which we find in Olson’s animalism, i.e. we 
are not defined by our psychological elements. Olson denies what is 
commonly referred to as the psychological approach which suggests what 
we are is to be found in psychological connections : Jones is his 
psychological connections or continuity. This problem is more complex than 
the problem of ‘personhood’. Accepting that what we can mean by 
‘person’ is a matter of convention seems somewhat intuitive. But we 
also have a very deep relationship to what is going on in our brains, 
making the intuition that we are our memories and our thoughts 
particularly strong. Our identities seem wrapped up in this inner 
collection of mental items. We call this view psychological reductionism, 
i.e. Jones is his mental connections. Notice that psychological reductionism 
is not dualistic to the extent that there may be only one physical being 
whose states are mental. Nor do we have to attach psychology to the 
problem of personhood since, being a part of the person club might 
require all kinds of surprising capacities, e.g. commercial 
incorporation.  
Olson’s thinking-animal argument, however, is a very persuasive 
argument against psychological approaches. It relies fundamentally on 
parsimony. His intuition is that only one thinker should suffice in the 
ontological explanation of our thoughts. This intuition Olson derives 
from the too-many-thinkers problem.  
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Some philosophers have argued that we could have more than 
one thinker in our heads. For example, it does not strike Roland 
Puccetti as a problem that more than one person or thinker is 
involved in our thinking. He argues that brain bisection demonstrates 
that we are two28. Others might argue that dissociative identity 
disorder (multiple personalities) also suggests that we could be many 
thinkers. To these philosophers, the too-many-thinkers problem 
might not be more than an intuition.  
Olson’s thinking-animal argument, however, relies on the idea 
that we could not be more than one being having identical thoughts ; 
otherwise we could not tell each other apart. In other words, the 
being which is having our thoughts and shares our location, is exactly 
one specific human animal. We could not know we are not that 
animal since there could be no other fact available to us to help draw 
any distinction29. Therefore it would seem that the possibility that we 
can have more than one ‘personality’ or be of ‘many minds’ does not 
affect the thinking-animal argument. Olson discusses this in depth in 
“Was Jekyll Hyde ?” In this article he argues that “the number of 
human people is simply the number of properly endowed human 
animals30”, i.e. one.  
Others like Kathleen V. Wilkes, who holds a cohabitation view, 
might agree that decisions over persons and personalities depend on 
what we decide31. Nothing stops the definition of ‘person’ from 
changing with time. So perhaps, as Wilkes suggests, the number of 
people is equal to the number of functioning personalities32. Despite 
this conventionalism being similar to what I suggested in the 
introduction, my impression remains that Olson is arguing in favour 
of an identity of ‘person’ with ‘human animal’. 
Arguably, the landscape would change to some extent if we 
adopted this new definition. For one thing, pregnant-Jones would be 
two people. Still, adjectives could resolve ambiguities, e.g. there could 
be pre-natal persons and no one would deny that legal-persons such 
______________ 
28 Puccetti, R. (1973), “Brain Bisection and Personal Identity”, p. 339-355. 
29 Olson, E.T. (2004), “Animalism and the Corpse Problem”, p. 266. 
30 Olson, E.T. (2003b), “Was Jekyll Hyde ?”, p. 328-348. 
31 Wilkes, K. V. (1988), Real People: Personal Identity without Thought Experiments, 
p. 198. 
32 Ibid., p. 199. 
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as Monsanto pose many problems.  Perhaps Olson does not state 
emphatically that ‘human person’ should mean the exact same thing 
as ‘human animal’ because of complications regarding pre-birth and 
abortion.  
Olson’s primary goal however, is to discard the notion that what 
we are is our linked mental states. This implies Jones is nothing mental. 
In “Animalism and the Corpse Problem”, Olson reconstructs a 
counter-argument to his thinking-animal argument, which he claims 
is raised by Shoemaker and Baker. The argument is formulated as 
follows : 
 
A : Assume Jones is an animal.  
P1 : Jones’ death will cause a corpse (material object). 
P2 : Jones’ corpse must exist before his death in that it exists as his 
body. 
P3 : Jones’ body has the same thoughts Jones has. 
P4 : If Jones shares identical thoughts with another being, he 
cannot know he is not that being. 
P5 : Jones is his body and a body is not an animal. 
C : Jones is not an animal33. 
 
Again this counter-argument relies on the ambiguity of ‘is’, which 
I have suggested is the most intriguing element in Olson’s search for 
an adequate bodily criterion. In the counter-argument above we 
should see that Jones is an animal and is a body and is a corpse.  
Olson counters by arguing that the persistence conditions of these 
three things are different. But, arguably, there is a way to make the 
sentence Jones is an animal and is a body and is a corpse come out true. It 
is simply to recognize the ‘is’ involved is shifting. The confusion can 
be shown by the following example : Jones is buried in the Cimetière de 
Passy. We can see that Jones ‘is’ and ‘is not’ at the same time.  
‘Is’ is the culprit 
Consider Jones is a human animal. Which ‘is’ are we confronted 
with ? The is of definition perhaps ? An example of this ‘is’ might be 
______________ 
33 Olson, E. T. (2004), “Animalism and the Corpse Problem”, p. 265-274. 
Note my addition of ‘Jones’. 
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found in the argument-provoking-expression which Edmund Gettier 
attributed to Plato : “knowledge is a justified true belief” or by 
knowledge I mean a justified true belief34. Extending to our example 
we could state that by ‘Jones’ I mean ‘a human animal’.  But, the name 
‘Jones’ does not sufficiently define the concept ‘human animal’ and 
so we may conclude the meaning of ‘Jones’ is not ‘a human animal’. 
If there is an is of definition it does not as of yet obviously apply.  
It is similarly doubtful that the ‘is’ in Jones is a human animal is the is 
of synonymy. After all, ‘Homo sapiens’ is a synonym for ‘human 
animal’, but not for ‘Jones’. We can also quickly disregard the is of 
simile as in : Jones is like a human animal. The youthful colloquialism is a 
humorous bonus but can also be disregarded, as in : Jones is like totally 
a human animal. 
We can try the is of classification.  Jones is a singer might be like Jones is 
a human animal. Still, being a singer, as we have noticed, is more 
contingent than being an animal. We are singers temporarily. This 
seems to summarise the debate between Baker and Olson. For Baker, 
Jones is a singer and a human animal and both are involved in the 
constitution of Jones-the-person.  For Baker, people exist, but for 
Olson, it is Homo sapiens that exist. For other philosophers, what is, 
is Jones’ mental continuity. Is ‘is’ culpable ? 
‘Is-forms’ 
I will continue this research a little longer. Call these is-forms. Is 
predication formed by an is-form ? Is Jones is a human animal like 
saying Jones is tall ? To Olson, Jones is a human animal implies 
something in a more permanent sense. Jones may not have always 
been tall. 
Proper Names 
Jones is free to change his name but can he change his being an 
animal ? Most animals have never had names so animal-Jones needs 
no name. I presume that before the development of language there 
would have been no ‘Jones’ so by ‘Jones’ perhaps, we only point to 
the animal as Olson seems to imply. For Baker, ‘I’ is what creates the 
______________ 
34 Gettier, E. (1963), “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge ?”,  p. 121-123. 
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person-Jones in that a first person consciousness is what Jones is. To 
Olson, this leads to the too-many-thinkers problem.  
‘Is’ is so perplexing that I suggest we are easily fooled when we 
shift from one usage to another. One might wonder just how often 
‘is’ is the source of a verbal dispute and if this is precisely what is 
going on between Olson and Baker.  
Possibly, and following Olson, the resolution of our is-problem is to 
be found in the is of identity. For example, David Jones is David Bowie 
and both denote the same human animal. David Bowie is the 
identical human animal that was once baptised David Jones and who 
was once a fetus. Who could argue with the statement : Jones is Bowie ? 
But what about : Jones is his fetus ? 
Well, our solution is far from perfect. Beliefs about Jones might 
never coincide with beliefs about Bowie, otherwise Jones is 22-years-
old, 63-years-old and a fetus.  
Consider the following : either Jones ceased to exist when Bowie 
arrived or Jones is still there. On these grounds Bowie and Jones are 
thinking each other’s thoughts and neither Bowie nor Jones can tell 
which of the two he is.  This is analogous to the fetus problem raised 
in “Was I Ever a Fetus35 ?” The question is : did Jones just disappear ?  
Olson has a simple solution to this puzzle, which is to suggest that 
Jones “came to be” Bowie. Presumably, fetus-Jones came to be baby-
Jones and to be David Jones, and so forth. Numerical identity 
functions in part by resolving this kind of naming dilemma. But, we 
seem to be stuck with a query : is there an is of three-dimensions and an is 
of four-dimensions ? To speak of Jones would seem to imply Jones’ 
entire animal life as in Jones is his world-line. Could we ever meet 
Jones ? 
Still, this idea of numerical identity is interesting. It does help us 
keep up with the Joneses. The Jones in Men in Black, i.e. Tommy Lee 
Jones is not the same Jones as is David Robert Jones. So we might 
infer from this that the is of identity is tied to numerical identity and to 
another is-form, i.e. the is of ontology.  
By the is of ontology, I wish to imply that it is coherent to say simply 
that Tommy Lee Jones is in the sense of exists. Admittedly, the is of 
ontology in the expression Tommy Lee Jones is, seems very different from 
the is of ontology for the expression the ‘is of ontology’ is. Similarly, Tommy 
______________ 
35 Olson, E. T. (1997b), “Was I Ever a Fetus ?”, p. 100-102.  
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Lee Jones is Agent K in “Men in Black” needs consideration. The is of 
ontology of ‘is’ is even more confusing. ‘Is’ itself is, at least in the way 
that words exist, whatever that is. Still, there does seem to be a clear 
sense in which words exist in a different way than do human animals. 
Is there an is of numbers versus say, an is of physical objects ? Olson asks 
how anyone could completely deny the existence of numbers36 ? This 
would seem a very cumbersome system ; however it is a perfectly 
natural part of our remarkable linguistic abilities.  
What then is the is of logical identity ? Frege does an interesting job 
of distinguishing two forms in his analysis of ‘sameness’37. ‘A is A’ is 
less informative than ‘A is B’. Frege pointed out that there is less 
cognitive value in ‘1=1’ than in ‘1=2-1’.  So, the statement Jones is a 
human animal must be more like this second variety. Otherwise, 
Olson’s claim, “I am an animal” is a trivial tautology. It might be the 
case nonetheless, that the statement I am an animal, lacks some 
philosophical content. But, can Jones is a human animal be like 1=2-1 ? 
We can perhaps return to the is of numerical identity. In other 
words : Jones is numerically identical with that (specific) human animal. We 
should keep in mind that we could use ‘Jones’ to denote the 
numerically identical animal that was once a fetus and who may one 
day lose his mental capacities. But Jones can only be numerically 
identical to the being he was or will be, whatever that is, and not to 
any human animal. As we have observed, we can see there is some 
sense to the statement : by ‘Jones’ I refer to all the stages of Jones’ human life. 
So there seems to be a connection between the is of ontology and the is 
of reference, once we have considered this idea of numerical identity.  
But what exactly is numerical identity and do we really want to 
accept it ? If we do not accept numerical identity we are faced with a 
new problem – for every Planck instant of Jones there is a new Jones. 
There are simply trillions of slightly varied Jones-versions and none 
of them are identical. It does however seem strange to think of say, 
Will Smith meeting Tommy Lee Jones for a few seconds in an 
elevator and saying, “Hello Jones AXC45551. How are all of you 
Joneses doing ? Oh, this is my floor... see you later Jones 
AXC87657.” And this only leads us to more problems.  
______________ 
36 Olson, E. T.  (1997a), The Human Animal, Personal Identity Without Psychology, 
p. 155. 
37 Frege, G. (1980), “On Sense and Reference”, p. 22-50.  
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1. What connects each of these Joneses ? Causality ?  
2. Is there a basic ontological unit ? For example, is Jones 
just the set that contains trillions upon trillions of living-
Jones-states and how is this compatible with all the 
minute particles that make up any individual Jones stage ?  
3. If we follow David Lewis, even possible versions of Jones 
can be said to exist. Jones is his possibilities !  
 
Olson relies heavily on numerical identity which he connects to 
persistence conditions. His work in recent years deals greatly with 
problems of time and the difficulties related to our deep inability to 
conceive of time in a satisfactory way. So this is far from being a 
problem entailed by animalism – it is a problem for ‘is’.  
‘Is’ is not always clearly connected to time, e.g. the is of metaphor. 
But any use of the is of ontology is stuck with an explanation of time. 
Modern physics has made interesting advances on the subject but to 
speak of ‘is’ in an ontological way is to talk of an individual over 
time – it seems at once to refer to now and to entail ties to the past. 
Therefore, one ought not to be embarrassed for being confused by 
‘is’ because it appears everybody is. These problems lead Olson to 
conclude : “That is why I say I don’t know what we are38”.  
The title of Olson’s book “What Are We ?” shows his fascination 
for metaphysics. Other than to simply say : Jones is, which is not far 
away from Heidegger’s Dasein, isn’t every other is-form just another 
way of describing Jones ? Can we ever get to the bottom of ‘is’ ? Is 
Olson only describing the ‘is’ of Jones in a different way to Baker ? 
My study of ‘is’ in animalism makes me wonder if I am only retracing 
steps.  
On Collapsing Categories 
In this process of unpeeling the word ‘is’, the one striking element 
is that is-forms seem to require a basic logic to separate them. Are we 
in the presence of Aristotle’s and Kant’s categories ? Are the 
categories simply the possibility of understanding ? This is not to say 
that we are correct in how we use ‘is’ in every instance. Certain 
______________ 
38 Olson, E.T. (2007b), “What Are We ?”, p. 55. 
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categories may drop away with time. But, it is fair to suggest the logic 
of ‘is’ yields yes/no, true/false, fiction/non-fiction, 
numerical/qualitative, being/non-being, eternal time/dynamic time, 
sets/individuals, living/non-living, is/was/will be, cause/effect, 
possible/necessary/actual and so forth. I’m not saying these things 
are real beyond the linguistic framework, but I believe I am saying 
there is an argument for keeping them. 
What we find in the analysis of is-forms seems to be our “form of 
life”. We are perhaps engaged in a phenomenology of our own 
conceptual frameworks to the extent that we discover them in the 
logic of our experience and beyond. I say beyond because one of the 
elements of the framework, as I mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, is the objective world that may contain no experiences. 
And though we posit this outer objective world we are reasonably 
justified in doing so. This is in effect the domain of many sciences. 
We need an objective framework as well as a subjective one. 
Otherwise we can make no sense of Jones is seeing a series of red dots on a 
colour-field of green dots in contrast with Jones is being irradiated with a 
wavelength range of approximately 637nanometres. Both are in the web of 
“how we play the game39”. So the question : Does red exist ? implies 
the question : Do you mean for Jones ? Similarly, the idea that red is the 
wavelength 630 to 740 nm makes no sense without evoking a 
subjective experience and an objective reality.  
When reconsidering Jones is a human animal, we may recall Olson’s 
use of “comes to be” regarding fetus-Jones and old-Jones. What is 
“comes to be” ? I suggest it is the verb ‘is’ supported with the 
category ‘past/present/future’. We could not make sense of the 
statement : fetus-Jones comes to be old-Jones without this category. I am 
not, however, suggesting that the arrow of time and causality are 
objective facts.  
Parfit seems to be making this point in “Experiences, Subjects and 
Conceptual Schemes”. The scheme he is referring to generates 
‘subject versus object’. His original motivations were ethical. The 
question he asks in Reasons and Persons is would we have a better world if it 
there were no people ? But when he engaged himself in finding ‘persons’ 
he found ‘is/was/will be’. And it is interesting to note that Christine 
______________ 
39 Wittgenstein, L. (1958), Philosophical Investigations, p. 38, §81. 
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M. Korsgaard40 argues the exact opposite view based on her ethical 
position :  
Suppose Parfit has established that there is no deep sense 
in which I am identical to the subject of experiences who 
will occupy my body in the future. [...] I nevertheless have 
reasons for regarding myself as the same rational agent. 
[These] reasons are not metaphysical, but practical.41  
Korsgaard is arguing for the category I/not-I. She may also be 
saying there is nothing out there that will tell us to be moral any more 
than that we shall find the idea of ourselves as agents out there. Or 
again, there is no ‘ought’ in the is of out there. Is not, her concern, the is 
of ought ? 
I think it is on these grounds that we cannot find certain features 
when we set about to analyze the concepts themselves. There is no ‘I’ 
because it is only a feature of a specific framework of understanding.  
If we continue our earlier reflections, Jones is a human animal, 
implies that Jones’ persistence conditions are unchanging. Olson’s 
animalism is based on the idea that there is at least one non-
negotiable condition of Jones-the-animal. This condition is that his 
remaining alive is necessary for him to persist. The link between 
fetus-Jones and old-Jones is that they share the same life. So we 
invoke the category living/non-living. As Olson argues : “The fetus 
or infant simply comes to be a person -- if it wasn’t a person 
already42”. Intuitively, how could we not recognize Jones after he has 
lost his mental capacities as the same joyous-Jones we knew ? We can 
switch to saying : Jones is no longer the same man, but it should be clear 
that our ‘is’ is slippery. 
The decision to keep numerical identity and attach it to animalism 
leads Olson to what he calls the biological approach. Biologists have 
been responsible for classifying the various life-forms. Human 
animals are among these life-forms. What we are is what biologists 
say we are. Most biologists probably accept the category living/non-
______________ 
40 Korsgaard, C. M. (no date), “Moral Animals”. 
41 Korsgaard, C. M. (1989), “Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency : A 
Kantian Response to Parfit”, p. 109. 
42 Olson, E. T. (1997b), “Was I Ever a Fetus ?”, p. 105. 
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living. Assuming we have properly argued that Jones is a human animal, 
it is safe to say that biologists tell us what and when Jones is.  
Now, I do not wish in any way to deny the value of biology as a 
science, nor would I accuse Olson of scientism. But while the claim 
that we are human animals is very interesting in biology, it might not 
be as interesting philosophically. Why ? Because what makes the 
claim Jones is a human animal interesting for biologists is that Jones is 
not a canine animal. Each species is relative to another and we can 
measure differences between them. In short, what makes biology 
interesting is the activity of comparison and the conclusions drawn 
from this activity.  
So the statement : Jones is a human animal has biological explanatory 
power. There are possible genetic manipulations as well as questions 
of what constitutes life versus death. The basic ontological unit of 
biology is the living cell, and so forth. But it may not be so clear that 
the statement Jones is a human animal makes as much sense in 
philosophy. Is Olson simply repeating in a less precise language what 
biologists are doing in a far more successful way ? Should we not just 
let the biologists work and look for some other vocation ? 
I admit that I often wonder what the vocation of philosophy is. 
There is a sense that the philosopher’s ultimate goal is to run out of 
questions ; historically, and I say this light-heartedly, as soon as a 
philosophical question finds an answer a science is born and a 
philosopher vanishes into thin air. Nonetheless, many scientists and 
philosophers have suggested that asking oddly metaphysical questions 
is something to avoid. Early 20th century philosophy became 
preoccupied by statements which took the form “x is nothing other 
than...” So perhaps we are nothing other than human animals. The 
seemingly profound biologically-detached question Sure, but what then 
is a human animal ? is just nonsense in the same way that the question 
What occurred before the Big Bang ? is nonsense to Stephen Hawking. 
Many puzzles have evaporated with our scientific advancements. No 
one would think to ask why moonlight is so much faster than 
sunlight given that it travels to the earth in under two seconds while it 
takes over 8 minutes for sunlight to travel to the earth. It just seems 
to be an improperly asked question. 
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But which ‘is’ are biologists using ? What does Jones is a human 
animal mean biologically versus ontologically ? Perhaps the is of biology 
is an is of classified scientific objects.  
Olson argues against Baker in his “Thinking Animals and the 
Constitution View” by saying we could eliminate all persons without 
losing one individual. But by the same argument, we could eliminate 
all human animals without losing one individual. Biologists need only 
conclude that we are something else. There is no clear link between 
which categories we use to create understanding and the ontology of 
the universe. We cannot simply point to our linguistic needs to 
uncover the riddles of nature. So, there may be no justifiable use of 
life versus non-life. Olson’s relativism is dependent upon the 
biological culture of our time. 
Furthermore, allowing that biologists would determine what we 
are might not lead to any kind of consensus. Some biologists might 
think we are human animals and others might think we are our 
genomes, our brains or our connectomes. Oddly, most of what is 
named in biology is what Olson would call arbitrary. He would argue 
there are no hands and no ears because these are not what Olson 
calls proper parts43. He would agree that we are made of our cells but 
not of our body parts. Olson would probably not agree with a good 
part of what biology does while classifying and naming. For example, 
we have no tooth number 17. The reason for this is it would imply 
you are your number 17 tooth-complement. But, you are you, not 
your number 17 tooth-complement. So your number 17 tooth-
complement must not exist or it inhabits the same location as you do 
and you could never know which of you, you are.  Indeed, there 
would be zillions of part-complement you versions44. This esoteric 
line of philosophical reasoning would probably bother the average 
biologist.  
Consider : 
1. Jones is nothing other than a human animal. 
2. Jones is numerically identical to nothing other than this 
human animal. 
 
______________ 
43 Olson, E. T. (1995), “Why I Have No Hands”, p. 182-197. 
44 Ibid., p. 196-197. 
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My sense here is that Baker presumes Olson means 1) when 
Olson actually means to say 2). This is reflected by Baker when she 
states : 
It is not the case that my continued existence is nothing other 
than [my emphasis] the continued existence of an 
organism... [A] first person perspective makes an 
ontological difference in the universe. It is beings with an 
‘inner life’ of the kind that can produce ‘the arts, the 
sciences, philosophy and civilization’.45  
But which beings are those if not the animals we are ? So the 'is’ is 
sliding from ontology to predication. We are not numerically identical 
to philosophers but we are identical with the animals that become 
philosophers.  
Consider Spinoza’s dictum : “One substance, many attributes”. 
Would we attend Jones’ funeral because he lost a tooth ? A hand ? 
No. We’d feel sorry for him and not for his hand. Olson is arguing 
that Jones stands independently of his non-life sustaining properties 
and I would add to this that keeping the is of ontology separate from the 
is of predication is to be found in our form of life. It would be like 
asking : Is red nothing other than the wavelength range of roughly 630-
740 nm ? But, Jones’ being numerically identical to a human animal 
does not preclude his potentially rich inner life. The rich inner lives of 
all animals do nothing to change their numerical identity.  
With is-forms we specify a categorical scheme. Not recognizing 
this pre-selection causes verbal disputes and category mistakes. If I 
say Jones is Jones, I am not denying him a rich inner life or the capacity 
of art, science and philosophy despite the ease with which I ought to 
accept the tautology46. So what task does saying Jones is a human animal 
perform ?  Well, neither example denies the rich potential qualities of 
Jones. On the day that : Jones is no longer Jones from the standpoint of 
numerical identity, it would seem we ought to attend his funeral. 
Anscombe’s unravelling of ‘I’ expresses this general problem. I do 
not see that her statement “‘I’ is neither a name nor any kind of 
______________ 
45 Baker, L. R. (2001), Persons and Bodies, p. 226. 
46 There are other readings for ‘Jones is Jones’. See “War is war” in 
Wittgenstein, L. (1958), Philosophical Investigations, p. 221. 
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expression whose logical role is to make a reference, at all47” is fully 
clear.  What I am suggesting ‘I’ is, is a category bound to ‘not-I’.  
The ‘is’ in thought experiments and narratives 
Thought experiments can be analyzed by the way in which they 
rely on is-forms. If we drop a category we have a thought experiment. 
Like Anscombe, we can drop ‘I/not-I’ and see if we can imagine a 
society without it. Like Rorty, we can drop the idea of qualia by 
collapsing subjective/objective ; these beings Rorty calls the 
Antipodians48. I have done something similar in another paper with 
true/false attempting to replace the category with assent/dissent ; I 
call these aliens Ataraxians. We could similarly imagine societies 
without fiction/non-fiction. This is the source of Daniel Dennett’s 
“The Self as Center of Narrative Gravity”49. His analogy regarding an 
object’s center of gravity is strong. What Dennett seems to have in 
mind is an is of narration : Jones is Jones’ center of narrative gravity. But how 
then do we distinguish between the is of biography and the is of fiction ? 
Jones’ self may be, in part, a fictional creation but it probably has 
some support in the ontological. Dennett argues “if you want to 
know what the self really is, you’re making a category mistake50”. The 
‘is’ has that slippery feeling again : saying Jones is his center of narrative 
gravity seems to be a category mistake depending on how we use the 
word ‘is’. Here, I am reminded of Olson’s tendency to return to the 
human animal. Isn’t Jones the human animal and not his abstract 
narrative center of gravity ?  
Arto Laitinen in “Sorting Out Aspects of Personhood”51 makes 
some very interesting points about the contribution made to personal 
identity through recognition by others. This too is compatible with 
Olson’s animalism. Wouldn’t human animal monads die of 
loneliness ?  
______________ 
47 Anscombe, E. (1975), “The First Person”, p. 59. 
48 Rorty, R. (1979), Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 70-127. 
49 Dennett, D. C. (1992), “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity”, p. 1-
11. 
50 Ibid., p. 10. 
51 Latinen, A. “Sorting Out Aspects of Personhood : Capacities, Normativity 
and Recognition” p. 248-270. 
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So what do we do with our intuitions regarding Tele-transporters, 
Brain-state-transfers, Brain-transplants, Head-grafting, and Cross-
fades between Jones and Smith ? Well, one might argue they are part 
of the is of fiction. Perhaps in considering them seriously we are 
making the error of not pre-selecting our categorical scheme by 
suggesting human animals can survive such things.  
By saying Jones is this human animal, we say very little about the 
richness of Jones-the-person. So we naturally feel that we have over-
abbreviated. Nagel, in an attempt to preserve an agnostic physicalism, 
did not try to deny the fundamental irreducibility of a bat’s 
experience52. Similarly, suggesting that Jones is a human animal does not 
detract from the depth of his inner life. Of course what it is like to be 
Jones, depends to a great extent on his being a human animal.  
Conclusion 
So what are Homo sapiens in the narrative sense of ‘is’ ? Well, 
some human animals take photographs ; like the ones taken by 
Eddington of an eclipse which supported Einstein’s theory that space 
curves under the influence of gravity. We’ve created photographs of 
faces 20 metres across and detailed images that astound, shock and 
dismay. We’ve seen views of space from Hubble as well as expanses 
of manufactured landscapes of waste photographed by Ed Burtynsky. 
Human animals have watched from Earth, a sunrise on Venus and 
sunset on Mars. Homo sapiens have been thoroughly inspired by a 
young man in Tiananmen Square stopping 4 tanks and many were 
shaken by images of Phan Thị Kim Phúc running naked, burnt from 
napalm.  
We have created deadly nuclear blasts and to this day allow for the 
starvation of children. 
We have made films about warring human animals like All Quiet 
on the Western Front, The Deer Hunter, Das Boot, La Vita est Bella and 
Apocalypse Now ; filmed concentration camp footage of the darkest of 
days and shared in Tornatore’s Cinema Paradiso, De Sica’s Ladri di 
Biciclette and Renoir’s La Bête Humaine. 
______________ 
52 Nagel, T. (1974), “What Is it Like to Be a Bat ?”, p. 435-450. 
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What other than a human animal was Rosa Parks, who refused to 
step to the back of a bus, adding momentum to a powerful 
movement for civil rights ? Who created the music of that 
movement ? What was Jimi Hendrix, when he played a most 
poignant version of The Star Spangled Banner on a screeching electric 
guitar, imitating bombs falling on Vietnam and bugle calls in ear 
shattering feedback ? The genius of human animals is everywhere. 
Mahatma Ghandi was a human animal who wanted his human 
animal friends to be treated with respect and have the right to 
determine their futures as other more privileged human animals. His 
method was to starve himself, the animal, harming no other animals. 
There have been many like him trying gracefully to be equally 
respected human animals.  
Which Homo sapiens created the “Guernica” ? Is Damien Hirst’s 
“For the Love of God” not the skull of a human animal covered in 
diamonds ? Van Gogh and Emile Nelligan were human animals.  
Haven’t we human animals gone places “no man has gone 
before” and done it from laptops in our living rooms ? Have we not 
seen historical treasures from every corner of the Earth and had the 
possibility of visiting all of them ? Watched aliens of every kind try to 
attack, avoid being abused or simply try to get home ? Wasn’t 
Armstrong a human animal walking on the moon ? 
Gene Krupa in 1937 playing wild jungle rhythms on Sing, Sing, 
Sing in Benny Goodman’s band was a human animal and songs like 
Somewhere Over the Rainbow, Louis Armstrong’s Hello Brother, Aretha 
Franklin’s Respect, Elvis Costello’s version of the unforgettable What’s 
So Funny ‘Bout Peace Love and Understanding ?  and John Lennon’s 
Imagine are the works of human animals. 
Who made our cities, cars, and jets, bridges like the Golden Gate and 
monuments like the Statue of Liberty, the Pyramids and the Eiffel Tower.  
Many human animals have open views on homosexuality and 
same-sex marriage in part because of films like Philadelphia, Broke Back 
Mountain, Milk and C.R.A.Z.Y. 
Painters like Frida Kahlo and sculptors like Camille Claudel were 
human animals and many have extraordinary voices like those of Jane 
Austen, de Beauvoir, Virginia Woolf, Mary Shelley, Billy Holiday, 
Josephine Baker, Wangari Maathai, Alice Walker and Toni Morrison.  
And finally, I agree with Olson : I don’t know what we are. 
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